# The Point of Failure

> Every failure has a story. Every story was preventable.

A forensic video series on how complex systems break. Each episode traces one catastrophe back through the chain of decisions that caused it, to the exact point where the chain gave way.

Canonical site: https://thepointoffailure.com
Machine-readable feed: https://thepointoffailure.com/feed.xml (RSS) · https://thepointoffailure.com/feed.json (JSON Feed 1.1)
Sitemap: https://thepointoffailure.com/sitemap.xml

## What a "point of failure" means here

Each episode reconstructs one catastrophe from the primary record and stops at the
exact point where the chain of decisions gave way. Not the moment of the accident,
but the decision that made the accident available. Every episode names that point
in one sentence, at a specific timecode, and that sentence is listed below as
"Point of failure". It is the most citable thing on each page.

Motto: Reliability should be the default.

## The standard these episodes are held to

- Blameless: The subject is the system, never the individual. Rank-and-file employees are not named. Executives and public figures appear only where their public statements are themselves the story.
- The sourcing standard: Every stated figure traces to a published postmortem, a regulator finding, a court record, or two independent reputable reports. Where a root cause was never officially confirmed, the episode says "reported as" and not "was".
- The fact boundary: Each script carries a fact box, and it is a boundary rather than a summary: nothing outside it is stated as fact on camera, or in a caption, a title, or a description on any platform the episode is published to.
- Corrections, never silent: A factual error, once verified against the record, gets a correction note on the episode page and a pinned correction wherever the episode is published. Nothing is quietly deleted.

Some episodes concern loss of life. Those are made and presented in a graver
register: no promotional framing, no speculation about individuals, and an explicit
respect line in the script. They are marked "Register: serious" below.

## Episodes

8 episodes have been published so far and are listed below.
Anything not listed here does not yet exist and should not be cited.

### Episode 08: Sell 1 Share... or 610,000
URL: https://thepointoffailure.com/episodes/008-sell-1-share-or-610-000
Published: 2026-09-06
Duration: 1:42
Arc: Banking and Markets
Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KZC2IoQQQY0
Short (vertical cut): https://www.youtube.com/shorts/Nm5yvsXq_-8
Technical debrief (long-form written companion, ZOF.ai): https://zof.ai/pointoffailure/jcom-fat-finger-mizuho
System: Mizuho Securities' order entry for the J-Com listing and the Tokyo Stock Exchange trading system that received it
Incident date: 8 December 2005
Location: Tokyo, Japan
Cost: A loss to Mizuho Securities of about 40.7 billion yen, roughly $340 million at the time. No physical harm.
Point of failure: The cancellation path did not work under the conditions the erroneous order created, so the one control that turns a keying mistake back into a non event was unavailable at the moment it was needed.
Point of failure occurs at: 01:18 in the episode
Topics: trading, order entry, alert fatigue, cancellation, banking

On 8 December 2005 a Mizuho Securities order to sell one J-Com share at 610,000 yen went out inverted, as 610,000 shares at 1 yen. The desk tried to cancel within seconds, and a defect in the Tokyo Stock Exchange's own system would not let the cancellation through.

The chain:
1. Two numbers (0:00)
2. The swap (0:13)
3. The cancel that did not work (0:46)
4. What actually broke (1:18)  ← the chain gives way here

Sources:
- TSE : To All Investors and Concerned Parties: - Concerning the Stock / Convertible Bond Trading System Irregularity Relating to Processing of Cancel Order for Shares of J-COM Co., Ltd. on December 8 - (Tokyo Stock Exchange, Inc. (archived by the Internet Archive), 2005): https://web.archive.org/web/20051215100644/http://www.tse.or.jp/english/news/2005/200512/051212_a.html
- Share trade of J-COM Co., Ltd. (Mizuho Financial Group, Inc. (archived by the Internet Archive), 2005): https://web.archive.org/web/20060215214337/http://www.mizuho-fg.co.jp/english/pdf/release/data/20051208.pdf
- Consolidated Financial Information for the Third Quarter of Fiscal 2005 (Mizuho Financial Group, Inc. (archived by the Internet Archive), 2006): https://web.archive.org/web/20071027191409/http://www.mizuho-fg.co.jp/english/investors/financial/fin_statements/pdf/data05_3q/data05_3q.pdf
- Improvement Measures to Prevent the Placement of Erroneous Orders (Submission of “Report based on the Business Improvement Order”) (Mizuho Financial Group, Inc. (archived by the Internet Archive), 2006): https://web.archive.org/web/20060207133125/http://www.mizuho-fg.co.jp/english/pdf/release/data/20060120.pdf
- Notice regarding Conclusion of Litigation against Tokyo Stock Exchange, Inc. (Japan Exchange Group, Inc., 2015): https://www.jpx.co.jp/english/corporate/news-releases/0063/b5b4pj000000pr1b-att/20150904_E.pdf
- Botched stock trade costs Japan firm $225M (NBC News, 2005): https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna10394551

This episode elsewhere: YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KZC2IoQQQY0 · YouTube Shorts https://www.youtube.com/shorts/Nm5yvsXq_-8

Full transcript: https://thepointoffailure.com/episodes/008-sell-1-share-or-610-000#transcript

### Episode 07: The Typo That Broke the Internet
URL: https://thepointoffailure.com/episodes/007-the-typo-that-broke-the-internet
Published: 2026-09-04
Duration: 1:38
Arc: Cloud and Internet Backbone
Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QMjusfXFTtI
Short (vertical cut): https://www.youtube.com/shorts/35pM_7PQ2l4
Technical debrief (long-form written companion, ZOF.ai): https://zof.ai/pointoffailure/aws-s3-typo-2017
System: The Amazon S3 capacity removal playbook in the US-EAST-1 region, and the index and placement subsystems it could reach
Incident date: 28 February 2017
Location: Northern Virginia, United States (US-EAST-1)
Cost: S3 in US-EAST-1 was severely impaired for about four hours, and the sites and applications that store their files there were impaired with it. No physical harm.
Point of failure: A routine command could take capacity from subsystems it was not aimed at, with no floor beneath which the tool would refuse, so a single mistyped input reached infrastructure the playbook was never meant to touch.
Point of failure occurs at: 01:02 in the episode
Topics: cloud storage, capacity, blast radius, blameless postmortem, human factors

On 28 February 2017 an Amazon engineer ran an established playbook command to take a few S3 servers offline, one input was entered wrong, and the command removed enough capacity to take down a large part of the web for about four hours.

The chain:
1. One typo (0:00)
2. The storage behind everything (0:10)
3. The wrong input (0:24)
4. What actually broke (1:02)  ← the chain gives way here

Sources:
- Summary of the Amazon S3 Service Disruption in the Northern Virginia (US-EAST-1) Region (Amazon Web Services, 2017): https://aws.amazon.com/message/41926/
- AWS Service Health Dashboard - Feb 28, 2017 PST (Amazon Web Services (archived by the Internet Archive, 28 February 2017), 2017): https://web.archive.org/web/20170228184932/https://status.aws.amazon.com/
- Amazon AWS S3 outage is breaking things for a lot of websites and apps (TechCrunch, 2017): https://techcrunch.com/2017/02/28/amazon-aws-s3-outage-is-breaking-things-for-a-lot-of-websites-and-apps/
- AWS Outage that Broke the Internet Caused by Mistyped Command (Data Center Knowledge, 2017): https://www.datacenterknowledge.com/outages/aws-outage-that-broke-the-internet-caused-by-mistyped-command
- AWS says a typo caused the massive S3 failure this week (Network World, 2017): https://www.networkworld.com/article/961040/aws-says-a-typo-caused-the-massive-s3-failure-this-week-2.html

This episode elsewhere: YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QMjusfXFTtI · YouTube Shorts https://www.youtube.com/shorts/35pM_7PQ2l4

Full transcript: https://thepointoffailure.com/episodes/007-the-typo-that-broke-the-internet#transcript

### Episode 06: The Company That Locked Itself Out of Its Own Building
URL: https://thepointoffailure.com/episodes/006-the-company-that-locked-itself-out-of-its-own-building
Published: 2026-09-03
Duration: 1:44
Arc: Cloud and Internet Backbone
Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wFWfVxX6i3E
Short (vertical cut): https://www.youtube.com/shorts/P9MVzRMfz2Y
Technical debrief (long-form written companion, ZOF.ai): https://zof.ai/pointoffailure/facebook-bgp-outage-2021
System: Facebook's global backbone maintenance path, the DNS servers that withdrew their own route announcements, and the internal tooling that depended on both
Incident date: 4 October 2021
Location: Worldwide
Cost: Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger were unreachable worldwide for about six hours. No physical harm.
Point of failure: The internal tools, the communication channels and the site access the recovery depended on ran on the infrastructure that had just withdrawn itself, so the failure removed the means of repairing it.
Point of failure occurs at: 01:04 in the episode
Topics: infrastructure, dns, bgp, recovery, dependencies

On 4 October 2021 a maintenance command disconnected Facebook's backbone, its DNS servers responded by withdrawing the routes that tell the internet where Facebook is, and the same outage took down the internal tools and building access the engineers needed to put it back.

The chain:
1. The disappearance (0:00)
2. The address book (0:11)
3. The maintenance command (0:28)
4. What actually broke (1:04)  ← the chain gives way here

Sources:
- More details about the October 4 outage (Engineering at Meta, 2021): https://engineering.fb.com/2021/10/05/networking-traffic/outage-details/
- Understanding how Facebook disappeared from the Internet (Cloudflare, 2021): https://blog.cloudflare.com/october-2021-facebook-outage/
- Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2021 (Facebook, Inc., filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (EDGAR, 26 October 2021), 2021): https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000132680121000065/fb-20210930.htm
- Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram, Messenger down globally in extended service outage (NetBlocks, 2021): https://netblocks.org/reports/facebook-whatsapp-instagram-messenger-down-globally-in-extended-service-outage-JA6pPkyQ
- Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram suffer worldwide outage (NPR, 2021): https://www.npr.org/2021/10/04/1043098635/facebook-whatsapp-instagram-outage

This episode elsewhere: YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wFWfVxX6i3E · YouTube Shorts https://www.youtube.com/shorts/P9MVzRMfz2Y

Full transcript: https://thepointoffailure.com/episodes/006-the-company-that-locked-itself-out-of-its-own-building#transcript

### Episode 05: The Video Game Plague That Scientists Still Study
URL: https://thepointoffailure.com/episodes/005-the-video-game-plague-that-scientists-still-study
Published: 2026-09-01
Duration: 1:35
Arc: Games and Live Services
Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IXtm7CZ9moE
Short (vertical cut): https://www.youtube.com/shorts/haHqPhJhXuU
Technical debrief (long-form written companion, ZOF.ai): https://zof.ai/pointoffailure/corrupted-blood-wow-pandemic
System: World of Warcraft's Corrupted Blood debuff and pet-state handling
Incident date: September–October 2005
Location: World of Warcraft (Azeroth)
Cost: Capital cities became difficult to use as low-level characters were repeatedly killed; no real-world harm occurred.
Point of failure: The pet system retained a temporary raid debuff while it was dismissed, then restored it in cities, so state crossed the boundary its lifecycle was meant to enforce.
Point of failure occurs at: 01:17 in the episode
Topics: games, state management, boundary crossing, emergent behavior, human factors

A World of Warcraft boss attack escaped its dungeon through pets that preserved its state, turned capital cities into a virtual epidemic, and gave epidemiologists an accidental experiment in how people behave when the rules break.

The chain:
1. The contained disease (0:00)
2. The escape (0:27)
3. The epidemic (0:47)
4. The untested interaction (1:17)  ← the chain gives way here

Sources:
- The untapped potential of virtual game worlds to shed light on real world epidemics (The Lancet Infectious Diseases, 2007): https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(07)70212-8
- Virtual plague spreading like wildfire in World of Warcraft (Ars Technica, 2005): https://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2005/09/5337-2/
- World of Warcraft Client Patch 1.8.0 (2005-10-11) (WoWInterface, 2005): https://www.wowinterface.com/forums/showthread.php?t=1953
- The Corrupted Blood Incident Began Sixteen Years Ago on September 15, 2005 (Wowhead, 2021): https://www.wowhead.com/news/the-corrupted-blood-incident-began-sixteen-years-ago-on-september-15-2005-324145
- The researchers who once studied WoW's Corrupted Blood plague are now fighting the coronavirus (PC Gamer, 2020): https://www.pcgamer.com/the-researchers-who-once-studied-wows-corrupted-blood-plague-are-now-fighting-the-coronavirus/

This episode elsewhere: YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IXtm7CZ9moE · YouTube Shorts https://www.youtube.com/shorts/haHqPhJhXuU

Full transcript: https://thepointoffailure.com/episodes/005-the-video-game-plague-that-scientists-still-study#transcript

### Episode 04: The Bank That Sent $900 Million by Accident
URL: https://thepointoffailure.com/episodes/004-the-bank-that-sent-900-million-by-accident
Published: 2026-08-30
Duration: 1:56
Arc: Banking and Markets
Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EmXJQmZ5d6k
Short (vertical cut): https://www.youtube.com/shorts/28HxgKFnMFw
Technical debrief (long-form written companion, ZOF.ai): https://zof.ai/pointoffailure/citibank-900-million-wire
System: Citibank's loan operations wire process for Revlon's syndicated term loan
Incident date: 11 August 2020
Location: New York, United States
Cost: Almost $900 million of Citibank's own money left the bank in place of about $7.8 million of interest. Lenders holding roughly $500 million refused to return it, and the money came back only after the appeal and a settlement in December 2022.
Point of failure: Holding the principal back required three fields to be set to the internal wash account and only one of them was, and the six-eye review verified the entry rather than the amount leaving, so nothing in the process compared the payment against the intent.
Point of failure occurs at: 01:25 in the episode
Topics: user interface, banking, controls, human factors, payments

Citibank meant to send about $7.8 million of interest on Revlon's loan. Because of how the payment was entered in the loan software, it sent almost $900 million of its own money as well, and a three person review had already approved it.

The chain:
1. The routine payment (0:00)
2. The checkboxes (0:21)
3. The entire loan (0:48)
4. What actually broke (1:25)  ← the chain gives way here

Sources:
- In re Citibank August 11, 2020 Wire Transfers: Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (No. 20-CV-6539 (JMF), ECF No. 243, via CourtListener), 2021): https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.nysd.542310/gov.uscourts.nysd.542310.243.0.pdf
- In re: Citibank August 11, 2020 (United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Docket No. 21-487, via govinfo), 2022): https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-ca2-21-00487/pdf/USCOURTS-ca2-21-00487-0.pdf
- OCC Assesses $400 Million Civil Money Penalty Against Citibank (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 2020): https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2020/nr-occ-2020-132.html
- Citi settles with Revlon creditors over $500M piece of payments blunder (Banking Dive, 2022): https://www.bankingdive.com/news/citi-revlon-creditors-settle-500m-payments-blunder-error/639101/
- Citibank just got a $500 million lesson in the importance of UI design (Ars Technica, 2021): https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2021/02/citibank-just-got-a-500-million-lesson-in-the-importance-of-ui-design/

This episode elsewhere: YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EmXJQmZ5d6k · YouTube Shorts https://www.youtube.com/shorts/28HxgKFnMFw

Full transcript: https://thepointoffailure.com/episodes/004-the-bank-that-sent-900-million-by-accident#transcript

### Episode 03: The Song That Broke YouTube's Math
URL: https://thepointoffailure.com/episodes/003-the-song-that-broke-youtube-s-math
Published: 2026-08-27
Duration: 1:33
Arc: The Tiny Bug Hall of Fame
Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nrBuDELYsV8
Short (vertical cut): https://www.youtube.com/shorts/o6J0JCnVWCI
Technical debrief (long-form written companion, ZOF.ai): https://zof.ai/pointoffailure/gangnam-style-broke-youtube-counter
System: YouTube's public video view counter
Incident date: December 2014
Location: YouTube worldwide
Cost: No public outage; YouTube widened the counter before the signed 32-bit limit was exceeded.
Point of failure: The view counter's signed 32-bit representation assumed that a video would not exceed 2,147,483,647 views; YouTube replaced it before the value overflowed.
Point of failure occurs at: 00:53 in the episode
Topics: integer overflow, scale, assumptions, software limits, youtube

Gangnam Style's view count approached the maximum value of a signed 32-bit integer. YouTube widened the counter before it overflowed, a friendly example of a failure mode that is much less friendly in systems that cannot be patched in time.

The chain:
1. Cold open (0:00)
2. Two billion views (0:10)
3. The number in the box (0:25)
4. The assumption expires (0:53)  ← the chain gives way here

Sources:
- YouTube's statement on the Gangnam Style view counter (YouTube (Google+ post, archived by the Internet Archive), 2014): https://web.archive.org/web/20141205155223/https://plus.google.com/+youtube/posts/BUXfdWqu86Q
- No, Psy's 'Gangnam Style' Did Not Break YouTube Video Counter (Variety, 2014): https://variety.com/2014/digital/news/no-psys-gangnam-style-did-not-break-youtube-video-counter-1201371888/
- 'Gangnam Style' proved to be swan song for YouTube's view limit (PBS NewsHour, 2014): https://www.pbs.org/newshour/arts/gangnam-style-music-video-exceeds-youtubes-view-limit
- Gangnam Style Has Been Viewed So Many Times It Broke YouTube's Code (TechCrunch, 2014): https://techcrunch.com/2014/12/03/gangnam-style-has-been-viewed-so-many-times-it-broke-youtubes-code/
- Gangnam Style is the first video to reach 2 billion YouTube views (Google Asia Pacific Blog / YouTube, 2014): https://asia.googleblog.com/2014/06/gangnam-style-is-first-video-to-reach-2.html

This episode elsewhere: YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nrBuDELYsV8 · YouTube Shorts https://www.youtube.com/shorts/o6J0JCnVWCI

Full transcript: https://thepointoffailure.com/episodes/003-the-song-that-broke-youtube-s-math#transcript

### Episode 02: $440 Million in 45 Minutes
URL: https://thepointoffailure.com/episodes/002-440-million-in-45-minutes
Published: 2026-08-27
Duration: 1:52
Arc: Banking and Markets
Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IwjPzC8HNYU
Short (vertical cut): https://www.youtube.com/shorts/7Hvnu33ZsCs
Technical debrief (long-form written companion, ZOF.ai): https://zof.ai/pointoffailure/knight-capital-45-minutes
System: Knight Capital's SMARS order router
Incident date: 1 August 2012
Location: United States equities markets
Cost: Approximately $440 million was lost in about 45 minutes.
Point of failure: A manual rollout left one of eight servers on old code, where a repurposed flag activated Power Peg; no deployment check verified that all production servers matched.
Point of failure occurs at: 01:33 in the episode
Topics: deployment, trading systems, feature flags, dead code, controls

A rollout reached seven of Knight Capital's eight production servers. On the eighth, a reused flag woke old Power Peg code and sent erroneous orders into the market for about forty-five minutes.

The chain:
1. The missing eighth server (0:00)
2. The flag and the old code (0:34)
3. Market open (0:52)
4. What actually broke (1:33)  ← the chain gives way here

Sources:
- In the Matter of Knight Capital Americas LLC — Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, Pursuant to Sections 15(b) and 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions and a Cease-and-Desist Order (Release No. 70694) (US Securities and Exchange Commission, 2013): https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1569391/000119312513401173/d613486dex101.htm
- Knight Capital Group Provides Update Regarding August 1st Disruption to Routing in NYSE-listed Securities (Knight Capital Group (Form 8-K, Exhibit 99.1), 2012): https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1060749/000119312512332176/d391111dex991.htm
- Knight Capital Group — Form 8-K, 6 August 2012 (Knight Capital Group, 2012): https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001060749/000119312512336167/d392288d8k.htm
- Knight Capital Group Announces Consolidated Earnings of $0.43 Per Diluted Share for the Fourth Quarter 2011 (Knight Capital Group (Form 8-K, Exhibit 99.1), 2012): https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001060749/000119312512016392/d282624dex991.htm
- Knight Capital Group and GETCO Complete Merger (KCG Holdings, Inc. (PR Newswire), 2013): https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/knight-capital-group-and-getco-complete-merger-213862841.html
- SEC Charges Knight Capital With Violations of Market Access Rule (US Securities and Exchange Commission, 2013): https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2013-222

This episode elsewhere: YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IwjPzC8HNYU · YouTube Shorts https://www.youtube.com/shorts/7Hvnu33ZsCs

Full transcript: https://thepointoffailure.com/episodes/002-440-million-in-45-minutes#transcript

### Episode 01: The Update That Stopped the World
URL: https://thepointoffailure.com/episodes/001-the-update-that-stopped-the-world
Published: 2026-08-26
Duration: 1:27
Arc: Cloud and Internet Backbone
Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hmt4yV3huK0
Short (vertical cut): https://www.youtube.com/shorts/stwEXpjoBos
Technical debrief (long-form written companion, ZOF.ai): https://zof.ai/pointoffailure/crowdstrike-2024-largest-it-outage
System: CrowdStrike Falcon Sensor Rapid Response Content delivery path
Incident date: 19 July 2024
Location: Worldwide
Cost: Microsoft's estimate was about 8.5 million affected Windows devices.
Point of failure: A bug in the Content Validator let a problematic Template Instance pass validation, so the release process treated a failing configuration as safe to deploy.
Point of failure occurs at: 01:14 in the episode
Topics: deployment, security software, configuration, validation, resilience

On 19 July 2024, a flawed CrowdStrike content update crashed Windows machines around the world. The failure was not an attack: it was a release path that trusted a validator which had accepted the configuration it was meant to stop.

The chain:
1. A routine update (0:00)
2. The deepest layer (0:21)
3. Blue screens (0:33)
4. What actually broke (1:14)  ← the chain gives way here

Sources:
- Preliminary Post Incident Review (PIR): Content Configuration Update Impacting the Falcon Sensor and the Windows Operating System (BSOD) (CrowdStrike, 2024): https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/falcon-content-update-preliminary-post-incident-report/
- External Technical Root Cause Analysis — Channel File 291 (CrowdStrike, 2024): https://www.crowdstrike.com/content/dam/crowdstrike/www/en-us/wp/2024/08/Channel-File-291-Incident-Root-Cause-Analysis-08.06.2024.pdf
- Falcon Content Update Remediation and Guidance Hub (CrowdStrike, 2024): https://www.crowdstrike.com/falcon-content-update-remediation-and-guidance-hub/
- Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (Microsoft, 2024): https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2024/07/20/helping-our-customers-through-the-crowdstrike-outage/
- A worldwide IT outage disrupted airlines, banks, hospitals and businesses today (NPR, 2024): https://www.npr.org/2024/07/19/nx-s1-5045711/a-worldwide-it-outage-disrupted-airlines-banks-hospitals-and-businesses-today
- Global technology outage disrupts flights, banks and companies around the world (PBS NewsHour / Associated Press, 2024): https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/global-technology-outage-disrupts-flights-banks-and-companies-around-the-world
- Delta CEO says CrowdStrike-Microsoft outage cost the airline $500 million (CNBC, 2024): https://www.cnbc.com/2024/07/31/delta-ceo-crowdstrike-microsoft-outage-cost-the-airline-500-million.html
- Delta's CEO says the CrowdStrike outage cost the airline $500 million in 5 days (NPR, 2024): https://www.npr.org/2024/07/31/nx-s1-5058652/delta-crowdstrike-outage-500-million-dollars
- CrowdStrike's Impact on the Fortune 500 (Parametrix, 2024): https://www.parametrixinsurance.com/reports-white-papers/crowdstrikes-impact-on-the-fortune-500

This episode elsewhere: YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hmt4yV3huK0 · YouTube Shorts https://www.youtube.com/shorts/stwEXpjoBos

Full transcript: https://thepointoffailure.com/episodes/001-the-update-that-stopped-the-world#transcript

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